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The Saga of State ‘Amazon’ Laws:
Reflections on the Colorado Decision
by David Gamage and Darien Shanske
David Gamage Darien Shanske
Introduction
The battle over states’ attempts to tax remote
e-commerce vendors is evolving too rapidly for aca-
demic scholarship to keep pace. At any moment,
Congress could pass a version of the Marketplace
Fairness Act1 and upend the entire discussion. In
the meantime, Amazon.com itself is making a sepa-
rate peace with many individual states.2 Never-
theless, this story is far from over. In this column,
we comment on an important recent development:
the opinion of the Colorado district court in Direct
Marketing Association v. Huber, a decision that is
now being appealed to the Tenth Circuit.3
As a quick refresher, the Colorado statute at issue
(along with its implementing regulations) would
require that notice be given by retailers with each
transaction that the use tax is due,4 require that
purchasers who purchase more than $500 from a
retailer be sent an annual report,5 and require that
the retailers provide the state with a record of all
Colorado purchases.6 There are penalties for failing
to provide the required notices; for instance, there is
a $5 penalty for each failure to notify a taxpayer that
use tax is due.7
The district court permanently enjoined the Colo-
rado Act and Regulations,8 granting a permanent
injunction on the basis of two separate arguments
made by the plaintiffs based on the U.S. Constitu-
tion’s dormant commerce clause. In so doing, the
district court cleverly avoided opining on some
tricky doctrinal questions. But the questions re-
main. We discuss some of those questions below. We
do not attempt to fully answer them here, though we
do suggest why they might matter a great deal.
Attention, Tenth Circuit
Below are the doctrinal twists that we would urge
the Tenth Circuit to consider.
An Injunctive Catch-22?
In both its original preliminary injunction9 and
its later grant of summary judgment,10 the district
court in Huber analyzed the Colorado Act and Regu-
lations, using case law on the constitutionality of
taxes under the dormant commerce clause. In par-
ticular, the district court focused on Quill, which
1S. 1832, 112th Cong. (2011-2012).
2See, e.g., John Buhl, ‘‘Amazon Reaches Tax Deal With
Nevada, Negotiating With Texas,’’ State Tax Notes, Apr. 30,
2012, p. 273, Doc 2012-8704, or 2012 STT 80-1.
3Amy Hamilton, ‘‘Colorado DOR Appealing Federal Ruling
in ‘Amazon’ Case,’’ State Tax Notes, May 7, 2012, p. 352, Doc
2012-9182, or 2012 STT 84-2.
4Colo. Rev. Stat. section 39-21-112(3.5)(c)(I). Note that
retailers with less than $100,000 in gross sales in Colorado
are not required to give those notifications. 1 Colo. Code Regs.
section 201-1:39-21-112.3.5 (3)(c)(i).
5Colo. Rev. Stat. section 39-21-112 (3.5)(d)(I)(a); 1 Colo.
Code Regs. section 201-1:39-21-112.3.5 (1)(a)(iii).
6Colo. Rev. Stat. section 39-21-112 (3.5)(d)(II)(a).
7Colo. Rev. Stat. section 39-21-112 (3.5)(c)(II).
8This is how the district court phrases the combination of
the statute passed by the Colorado General Assembly and the
regulations promulgated by the Colorado Department of
Revenue.
9Direct Marketing Association v. Huber, No. 10-cv-01546-
REB-CBS, 2011 WL 250556 (D. Colo. Jan. 26, 2011). Doc
2011-2004 or 2011 STT 2011-2012.
10Direct Marketing Association v. Huber, No. 10-cv-01546-
REB-CBS, 2012 WL 1079175 (D. Colo. Mar. 30, 2012). Doc
2012-6911 or 2012 STT 64-4.
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was an application of the first prong of the Complete
Auto test, a test that is supposed to apply to the
imposition of taxes.11
However, the federal Tax (Anti-)Injunction Act
(TIA) in relevant part states that ‘‘the district courts
shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment,
levy or collection of any tax under State law where a
plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the
courts of such State.’’12 In other words, federal
courts do not have jurisdiction to enjoin the assess-
ment of taxes; instead, taxpayers must wait until
they have already paid the tax and are filing a suit
for refund before they can challenge a tax.13
If the Colorado Act and
Regulations constitute a tax, the
court should not have jurisdiction
until the tax is actually collected.
And so the Catch-22 is this: If the Colorado Act
and Regulations were properly analyzed under Com-
plete Auto (and Quill), why did the district court
have the jurisdiction to enjoin them? If the Colorado
Act and Regulations constitute a tax, the court
should not have jurisdiction until the tax is actually
collected.14 Conversely, if the Colorado Act and
Regulations are not a tax, the district court presum-
ably should not have analyzed them using the Quill
and Complete Auto frameworks; instead, as we will
discuss below, the district court should have used a
different framework that is potentially more favor-
able to upholding the Colorado Act and Regulations.
To be sure, what constitutes a tax for purposes of
the TIA and for purposes of the dormant commerce
clause may well be different,15 but we do not know of
any precedents or existing arguments explaining
why a statute should be considered a tax for only one
of these and not the other.16 The litigants in Huber
discussed the TIA in footnotes,17 but the district
court did not address it. Especially considering that
the Supreme Court decision on the Patient Protec-
tion and Affordable Care Act is likely to involve a
significant discussion of the Anti-Injunction Act
(AIA), on which the TIA is based, this issue is worth
revisiting.18
Taxation vs. Regulation?
Let us suppose that the district court did have
jurisdiction because the Colorado Act and Regula-
tions do not constitute a tax for the purposes of the
TIA. If so, what test should be used to analyze the
Colorado Act and Regulations under the dormant
commerce clause, assuming that a nontax under the
TIA is also a nontax under the dormant commerce
clause? That question of nomenclature matters be-
cause there is consensus in the secondary literature
that taxes and nontaxes are to be subjected to
different tests.
11Id. at *15.
1228 U.S.C. section 1341. The TIA is itself based on the
Anti-Injunction Act (AIA) of 26 U.S.C. section 7421(a), which
is the subject of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act litigation. Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88 (2004). (‘‘Just as the
AIA shields federal tax collections from federal-court injunc-
tions, so the TIA shields state tax collections from federal-
court restraints.’’)
13Or they must proceed in state court if the laws of the
state allow it.
14Remember that failure to comply with the act and
regulations can lead to retailers bearing heavy penalties in
the aggregate. Do those penalties make the act and regula-
tions into a tax for purposes of the TIA? That is a tough
question. We observe that the reasonable test for the limits of
the TIA applied by the Tenth Circuit (and many others) is to
focus on whether the purpose of the statute is regulatory (not
barred by the TIA) or the collection of revenue (barred by the
TIA). Chamber of Commerce v. Edmondson, 594 F.3d 742,
760-764 (10th Cir. 2010). It seems straightforward that as for
the Act and Regulations, the state is primarily trying to
regulate behavior with those regulations, and yet that regu-
latory purpose is aimed at a greater purpose, namely, the
collection of (use) tax revenue.
15Cf. Bryan Camp and Jordan Barry, ‘‘Explanation of the
Anti-Injunction Act Issue in HHS v. Florida (Affordable Care
Act Litigation),’’ American Bar Association Preview of United
States Supreme Court Cases, Vol. 39, Issue 6-SE, 15, 19
(2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2018285 (explaining that it is quite possible that
a tax for purposes of the AIA might be different from a tax for
purposes of the federal government’s taxing power); Steve R.
Johnson, ‘‘Obamacare and the ‘What Is a Tax?’ Question —
Part II,’’ State Tax Notes, Mar. 26, 2012, p. 1037, Doc 2012-
3067, or 2012 STT 58-3 (also noting that the two questions
are different, following Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259
U.S. 20 (1922)); but see Brian Galle, ‘‘Conditional Taxation
and the Constitutionality of Health Care Reform,’’ 120 Yale
L.J. Online 27, 29-30 (2010) (reliance on the vitality of the
holding in Bailey v. Drexel Furniture is misplaced). Of course,
even if the definitions are actually different (versus theoreti-
cally, as is the case now), that does not necessarily decide
anything: A ‘‘tax’’ for purposes of the TIA may be the broader
category that includes ‘‘taxes’’ for purposes of the dormant
commerce clause. Indeed, it would make sense for the TIA, as
a matter of statutory interpretation, to ultimately shield even
unconstitutional taxes because this furthers Congress’s in-
tent to secure tax revenue before permitting litigation. Cf.
Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 43-44 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(Kavanaugh J., dissenting) (arguing that this is the state of
the law regarding taxes under the taxing power and AIA).
16This changed with the Supreme Court’s recent ACA
decision. This column was written before the release of this
decision. We register our initial response to the decision in the
Addendum to this column.
17See, e.g., Plaintiff ’s Motion for Summary Judgment, at
n.1 (explaining that the TIA was not meant to shield all laws
related to taxes and citing, for example Wells v. Malloy, 510
F.2d 74, 77 (2nd Cir. 1975) (Friendly, J.); Defendant’s Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment, at 6 n.3 (mention of TIA).
18See Camp and Barry and Johnson, supra note 15, for a
summary of the issues.
Academic Perspectives on SALT
198 State Tax Notes, July 16, 2012
(C) Tax Analysts 2012. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2111433
As for nontaxes, the standard test is well known
from Constitutional Law I. First, a court asks if a
regulation is discriminatory.19 If it is, the regulation
is subject to heightened scrutiny, a ‘‘virtually per se
rule of invalidity.’’20 Invalidity is only ‘‘virtually per
se’’ — a government can still triumph if it can ‘‘show
that it[s] [regulation] advances a legitimate local
purpose that cannot be adequately served by reason-
able nondiscriminatory alternatives.’’21
Even if a regulation is nondiscriminatory, it is
still subject to so-called Pike balancing, which is
reserved for laws ‘‘directed to legitimate local con-
cerns, with effects upon interstate commerce that
are only incidental. Under the Pike test, [courts] will
uphold a nondiscriminatory statute . . . unless the
burden imposed on [interstate] commerce is clearly
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.’’22
If the Colorado Act and
Regulations are not a tax, the
district court presumably should
not have analyzed them using the
Quill and Complete Auto
frameworks.
As we discussed previously, for taxes, there is a
different test, the Complete Auto test, and the con-
sensus opinion is that this test, in relevant part,
asks only whether the tax constitutes discrimina-
tion.23 There is not even the question whether there
are alternatives or whether the tax is necessary to
further a legitimate local purpose.
There is much that is bewildering about this
distinction in tests, which is at best implicit in
Supreme Court decisions.24 First, given that they
are so often substitutes,25 why distinguish taxes and
regulations at all? Second, why make the test for
taxes more stringent? If anything, the TIA suggests
that the courts give the states more leeway in
raising revenue. Third, does the distinction make
any practical difference, as the amorphous category
of discrimination could incorporate balancing-type
considerations?26
It might matter a great deal
whether a given state action can
ultimately be saved by considering
whether the state had no
alternatives.
Yet despite this theoretical incoherence and doc-
trinal vagueness, it might matter a great deal
whether a given state action can ultimately be saved
by considering whether the state had no alterna-
tives. Note that the district court evaded that ques-
tion by implicitly analyzing the Colorado Act and
Regulations as a regulation under Count I (discrimi-
nation), and hence considering alternatives, and
then analyzing the act and regulations as a tax
under Count II (undue burden).
Quill Was About a Regulation!
One peculiar twist is that Quill itself did not
involve an actual tax liability but rather a require-
ment to collect the use tax owed by others. So if Quill
was properly analyzed as a tax, it might seem that
the Colorado Act and Regulations should also be
analyzed as a tax. The implicit argument justifying
the analysis of the Quill regulations as a tax was
presumably that those regulations were close
enough to actually imposing a tax liability. Academic
research has confirmed the common-sense notion
that consumers do respond to taxes collected at the
moment of a purchase.27 Yet recent academic re-
search also suggests that consumers may respond
19United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 338.
20Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
21Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Environ-
mental Quality of State of Oregon, 511 U.S. 93, 100-101 (1994)
(citing New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278,
108 S.Ct. 1803, 1810, 100 L.Ed.2d 302 (1988)).
22United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 346 (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted, but citing Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at
624 and Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
23Dan T. Coenen, ‘‘Where United Haulers Might Take Us:
The Future of the State-Self-Promotion Exception to the
Dormant Commerce Clause Rule,’’ 95 Iowa L. Rev. 541, 599
(2010) (construing the absence of any balancing test from
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1979));
Edward A. Zelinsky, ‘‘The False Modesty of Department of
Revenue v. Davis: Disrupting the Dormant Commerce Clause
Through the Traditional Public Function Doctrine,’’ 29 Va.
Tax Rev. 407, 441 (2010) (‘‘In the wake of Complete Auto, the
Court has generally invalidated discriminatory state taxes
without affording the taxing states the opportunity to defend
their respective tax laws as necessary to further legitimate
public purposes’’).
24For example, tax cases (sometimes) give states the
opportunities to defend a discriminatory statute by demon-
strating a lack of alternatives. See, e.g., New Energy Company
of Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 274, 278-279 (1988) (The
Court entertains the possibility that there are no legitimate
alternatives in a tax credit case).
25David Gamage and Darien Shanske, ‘‘On Tax Increase
Limitations: Part I — A Costly Incoherence,’’ State Tax Notes,
Dec. 19, 2011, p. 813, Doc 2011-25440, or 2011 STT 243-3.
26Cf. Zelinsky, supra, note 23 at 442 (In Kentucky v. Davis,
the ‘‘Court avoided [finding discrimination] by deciding that
Kentucky’s tax law should not be scrutinized as a tax provi-
sion subject to Complete Auto and its rigorous discrimination
test’’).
27Traditional economic models typically predict that inci-
dence is split between purchasers and retailers based on
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less to a tax that is not collected at the time of
purchase.28 Therefore, the Colorado Act and Regu-
lations might arguably be less of a tax in this sense
than the regulations at issue in Quill because the
Colorado scheme does not require retailers to collect
the use tax at the time of purchase.
Discrimination Under the ‘New’ Dormant
Commerce Clause?
We have not discussed the core of the district
court’s analysis — namely, that the Colorado Act and
Regulations constitute discrimination for purposes
of the dormant commerce clause — and we will not
do so here at any length.29 Nevertheless, we want to
point out that recent Supreme Court jurisprudence
has not taken an expansive view of discrimination
under the dormant commerce clause. Most interest-
ingly, in 2007 in United Haulers, the Court essen-
tially overruled a recent decision in order to bless
the creation of an in-state monopoly in waste proc-
essing created by New York state (and its subdivi-
sions).30 In 2008 in Kentucky v. Davis, the Court also
blessed the tax exemption that each state grants to
the interest earned on its own municipal bonds —
and not to those of any other state.31 We will not
dwell on the details of those cases here or on what
they imply for review of the Colorado Act and
Regulations. For the present, we simply note that
those cases might suggest some interesting argu-
ments that Colorado (and other states) should per-
haps consider.
First, Colorado can argue that it did not have any
other alternatives for taxing all consumption in the
state, much like New York seemed to have no option
other than to establish a local monopoly in United
Haulers.32 Furthermore, along these lines, we think
that the Colorado Act and Regulations could prop-
erly be interpreted not as an attack on out-of-state
merchants, but rather as part of a comprehensive
scheme to maximize fairness and to minimize dis-
tortions in Colorado’s attempts to implement a
broad-based sales tax. Establishing an equitable tax
system seems to be as traditional a government
function as building infrastructure.33 Thus, Colo-
rado’s legislature seemed to have no protectionist
intent — another (sometimes) touchstone of dor-
mant commerce clause analysis.34 Finally, if one
believes that the essence of what the dormant com-
merce clause is meant to police is discrimination
that will lead to rounds of tit-for-tat retaliation —
thus undermining the national marketplace — it is
hard to see why Colorado’s statute offends the
dormant commerce clause.35
Alternatives?
Under the regulation analysis, even a regulation
found to be discriminatory is not doomed if it ‘‘ad-
vances a legitimate local purpose that cannot be
adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory
alternatives.’’ As for this question in connection with
the Colorado Act and Regulations, what the district
court labels ‘‘Second Tier’’ analysis, we will be curi-
ous to see what the Tenth Circuit makes of the
following passage from the district court opinion
discussing whether Colorado had legitimate nondis-
criminatory alternatives:
According to the defendant, Colorado has not
previously included a line on its income tax
returns for reporting use tax. However, be-
tween 1966 and 1974, the DOR included a
consumer use tax return with income tax re-
turn forms. That practice was discontinued
because the amount of tax collected did not
justify the printing expense.
The record contains essentially no evidence to
show that the legitimate interests advanced by
the defendant cannot be served adequately by
reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives.36
It would seem to us that abandoning an initiative
not worth the paper it was printed on is pretty good
evidence, especially in the context of ruling against a
party on summary judgment. We are also unclear
why a line on an income tax form would be superior
to a separate form. To the contrary, a separate form
seems at least as likely to get the attention of
taxpayers as a mere line. Further, coming from a
state (California) that has attempted with great
supply and demand, at least in the short term, with the
incidence not significantly depending on whether the legal
obligation to remit the tax is imposed on the purchaser or the
retailer. In contrast, more recent research on tax salience
suggests that it may matter whether the legal obligation to
remit is imposed on purchasers or retailers. David Gamage
and Darien Shanske, ‘‘Three Essays on Tax Salience: Market
Salience and Political Salience,’’ 65 Tax L. Rev. 19, 27-30 and
61-65 (2011).
28Id.
29For additional important arguments, see Alex Meleney,
‘‘Direct Marketing Association v. Huber, Federal District
Court Finds Colorado Use Tax Reporting Requirements Un-
constitutional,’’ Tax Management Weekly State Tax Report,
Vol. 2012, Issue 17, Apr. 4, 2012; Andrew Haile, ‘‘Defending
Colorado’s Use Tax Reporting Requirement,’’ State Tax Notes,
Sept. 20, 2010, p. 761, Doc 2010-16462, or 2010 STT 181-1.
30United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid
Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330 (2007).
31Department of Revenue of Kentucky v. Davis, 553 U.S.
328 (2008).
32United Haulers, 550 U.S. 330, at 334-336.
33United Haulers, 550 U.S. 330, at 344-345; see also
generally Darien Shanske, ‘‘The Supreme Court and the New
Old Public Finance: A New Old Defense of the Court’s Recent
Dormant Commerce Clause Jurisprudence,’’ 43 The Urban
Lawyer 659, 701-05 (2011).
34Shanske, id. at 700.
35Shanske, id. at 663-665.
36DMA v. Huber, supra, at *6 (citations omitted).
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vigor — and so far with little success — to get
taxpayers to pay their use tax on their income tax
forms,37 we are unsure how dubious an alternative
has to be before it is no longer given legal weight.
Thus, it is not clear why the state did not succeed in
showing that there were no nondiscriminatory alter-
natives.38 Now, the district court noted that the state
did not much argue that there were no such alter-
natives, including not building a record, and that
might pose an insurmountable challenge to Colo-
rado in appealing this case. Yet if all Colorado would
have to do to have its regulations upheld is to build
a meaningful record, the district court opinion per-
haps does not place much of a bar to prevent
Colorado from reenacting a modified version of its
act and regulations or from other states doing the
same.
Pike Balancing?
Again, there is a strong argument that the Colo-
rado Act and Regulations should have been analyzed
as a regulation and, as a regulation, that the act and
regulations were not discriminatory. If one accepts
that line of argument, the next step would be to
apply Pike balancing, and under Pike balancing,
there is then a sound argument that the Colorado
Act and Regulations should have been upheld. We
will not go through the Pike balancing analysis here.
Instead, we direct readers to Andrew Haile’s prior
discussion of that question.39
Attention Legislators (and the MTC)40
We do not know how to handicap Colorado’s
appeal, but it seems to us that there are a number of
fundamental questions that the district court opin-
ion failed to answer. Regardless, the Colorado dis-
trict court decision adds to a developing body of case
law that in the aggregate indicates a way forward
for states that want to tax interstate e-commerce
(and that do not want to wait for enabling federal
legislation that may never come).
Under a regulation analysis, the
lower the burdens placed on
remote vendors, the more likely
that a statute will survive dormant
commerce clause challenges.
The first approach that state legislatures should
consider for taxing interstate e-commerce is to mini-
mize the burdens that doing so places on remote
vendors. Under a regulation analysis, the lower the
burdens placed on remote vendors, the more likely
that a statute will survive dormant commerce clause
challenges. And even under a tax analysis, a statute
might survive dormant commerce clause challenges
if the statute avoids imposing any burdens on re-
mote vendors. To that end, one of the authors
(Gamage) has argued previously that the approach
of requiring remote vendors to collect use taxes
while compensating the remote vendors for all re-
sulting administrative and compliance costs can
successfully reduce the burdens imposed on remote
vendors to zero — thus potentially protecting a
statute from dormant commerce clause challenges.41
37See, e.g., California State Board of Equalization, ‘‘Dis-
cussion of Recent Economic Developments,’’ Publication 329,
Vol. XVII, No. 1, Feb. 2011, available at http://www.boe.ca.
gov/news/pdf/EP2-11.pdf. (California collected approximately
$10 million in use tax in 2010 and ‘‘only about 0.36 percent of
all personal income tax returns’’ reported use tax — and this
was an improvement!)
38Note that we do believe that Colorado did have a
nondiscriminatory alternative in that the state could have
compensated remote vendors for all the compliance costs
imposed by its act and regulations. Following that logic, and
assuming that the district court had properly found that there
was a discrimination, the district court (and the Tenth Cir-
cuit) might properly strike down Colorado’s Act and Regula-
tions on the grounds that they do not offer remote vendors
adequate compensation for compliance costs. Regrettably, in
our view, that was not the approach used by the district court
opinion. See David Gamage and Devin Heckman, ‘‘A Better
Way Forward for State Taxation of E-Commerce,’’ 92 B.U.
Law Rev. 483 (2012). We should reiterate that just because we
think that adding vendor compensation nullifies any argu-
ment that there is discrimination does not mean that the act
and regulations without compensation is necessarily a dis-
crimination; as indicated above, there are many viable argu-
ments to that effect.
39Haile, supra note 29.
40Amy Hamilton, ‘‘MTC Halts Work on Colorado-Style
‘Amazon’ Model Statute,’’ State Tax Notes, May 14, 2012, p.
441, Doc 2012-10081, or 2012 STT 92-2.
41David Gamage and Devin Heckman, ‘‘A Better Way
Forward for State Taxation of E-Commerce,’’ 92 B.U. Law
Rev. 483 (2012).
Does adequately compensating remote vendors obviate the
importance of this column’s discussion of the distinction be-
tween the tax and regulation frameworks for dormant com-
merce clause analysis? Perhaps not. First, as a matter of doc-
trine, and as noted previously, notifications like those in the
Colorado Act and Regulations may be more likely to be found
a regulation and thus be subject to a less rigorous test. Even
if courts ultimately disagree that adequate vendor compen-
sation can protect a tax statute from dormant commerce clause
challenges, courts might still uphold a tax regulation statute
that includes adequate compensation for remote vendors. Sec-
ond, retailers might come to prefer Colorado’s notification ap-
proach precisely because it means that consumers will not be
parting with more money at the moment of sale, thus perhaps
reducing the excess burden caused by the tax and shifting
some of the incidence from retailers to consumers. See note 26
and accompanying text.
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The second approach legislatures should consider
relies on using the state corporate income tax in lieu
of a sales or use tax as a device for taxing remote
vendors. To this end, one of the authors (Shanske)
has recently argued that a state corporate income
tax that is apportioned using a single sales factor
can function as a rough substitute for sales and use
taxes for remote vendors.42 Hence, by reforming
existing state corporate income taxes, states can tax
remote vendors while avoiding the obstacles the
dormant commerce clause places on imposing the
use tax collection obligation on remote vendors — as
a general matter, the rules governing nexus for the
purpose of the state corporate income tax are differ-
ent from the rules governing the collection of the
state sales tax.
A state corporate income tax that
is apportioned using a single sales
factor can function as a rough
substitute for sales and use taxes
for remote vendors.
Regardless of the outcome of the Colorado appeal,
then, states will have options for taxing transactions
between their citizens and remote vendors. Never-
theless, we urge the Tenth Circuit to directly ad-
dress the questions we raise in this column. The
existing case law surrounding the application of the
dormant commerce clause to interstate e-commerce
transactions has devolved into a morass. In our
view, the Colorado district court opinion (under-
standably) adds to that confusion. We thus exhort
the Tenth Circuit to clarify and rationalize the
application of the dormant commerce clause to state
sales and use taxation.
Addendum
The recent ACA decision distinguishes between a
tax for purposes of the AIA and for purposes of
Congress’s taxing power. National Federation of
Independent Business et al. v. Sebelius, Secretary of
Health and Human Services, 567 U.S. ___ (2012)
(Section II). The basic rule established by the ACA
decision is that the label given to a measure by
Congress is determinative of what a tax is under the
AIA, but that label does not govern for constitutional
analysis. The rationale for this distinction is that
the AIA is a creature of Congress and Congress
should be presumed to be consciously deciding
whether the AIA applies or not through its choice of
labels. Arguably this distinction should apply to the
TIA and the dormant commerce clause; state legis-
latures can also be presumed to know of the TIA
(and likely analogous state law provisions), and thus
the TIA applies only to state laws labeled as ‘‘taxes.’’
The dormant commerce clause, as a constitutional
provision, would look beyond labels. Yet it could be
maintained that Congress did not intend that the
states, as separate sovereigns, should have the pro-
tection granted to them by the TIA limited in this
(formalistic) way. Furthermore, to the extent that
the dormant commerce clause is an implied limita-
tion, one can argue that the judicial construction of
a ‘‘tax’’ for purposes of the dormant commerce clause
should be no broader than Congress’s construal of
what a tax is, as it is Congress that has the positive
power over commerce. This suggests that a ‘‘tax’’
should be exactly as broad under the dormant com-
merce clause as under the TIA (if not narrower). In
conclusion then, the ACA decision adds more to be
considered, but does not answer the questions we
have posed. ✰
42Darien Shanske, ‘‘A New Theory of the State Corporate
Income Tax: The State Corporate Income Tax as a Retail
Sales Tax Complement,’’ Tax L. Rev. (forthcoming), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2078
488 (making the argument noted above and also including
numerous qualifications, including about the effect of P.L.
86-272).
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